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The Impact of Natural Catastrophes on Property/Liability Insurers:  
A Geographical Proximity Analysis 
Xiao Sun 
 
We investigate the impact of hurricanes, as an anticipated natural disaster, on the premium incomes 
and stock prices of property and casualty insurers in the United States. Our sample consists of 
forty-seven publicly traded insurance firms in the U.S. and the three most serious hurricanes during 
the period from 2006 to 2014. The three hurricanes are broken down into 150 state-level hazards, 
including twenty-seven states that were directly affected by the disasters, twenty-seven states that 
were close-by, and ninety-six states that were unaffected. Our results show that insurers in all areas 
have a significant premium increase after hurricanes. Premium changes are significantly different 
between any two types of areas in an event year. In addition, we observe that the expected benefits 
from potential premium increases after a catastrophe appear to dominate the costs insurance 
companies incur as a result of policyholders’ reimbursement claims. However, while there are no 
obvious distinguishing results among areas, there is some discrimination. These results vary based 
on a state’s geographical proximity to a disaster. Insurers in close-by states enjoy some advantages 
from hurricanes. In contrast, insurers in affected states suffer negative consequences. Finally, we 
observe that the severity of hurricanes causes significant differences in abnormal performance. Big 
companies suffer negative impacts due to hurricanes. Higher returns on assets are associated with 
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There has been a significant rise in the frequency and severity of natural disasters. According to 
summary statistics provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
tropical cyclones accounted for the majority of losses among billion-dollar disaster events between 
1980 and 2014. Compared to other types of natural disasters, land falling tropical cyclones caused 
the most damage and had the highest average event cost. It is worth noting that during this period, 
sixty-five severe storms occurred, which represent the highest number of natural disasters that 
affected the U.S. During the same time period, tropical cyclones were the second most frequent 
type of disaster. Most recently, in 2014, there were eight weather and climate-related disaster 
events across the United States with losses exceeding $1 billion each.  
 
Facing such losses from natural catastrophes, insurance can protect citizens and governments via 
its risk sharing mechanism, especially when considering the increase in the frequency and intensity 
of natural catastrophes over recent years. As Kunreuther (1996) has advocated, insurance could be 
a potentially valuable tool to encourage loss reduction against natural disasters and to supply 
recovery funds to disaster victims. 
 
In addition to private insurance, governments should act as an insurance provider, especially if a 
given event is severe. Recent empirical work has stressed the need for government-assisted 
insurance to supplement private insurance arrangements (see Kunreuther, 1996; Litan, 2006; 
Botzen and Van Den Bergh, 2008; Michel-Kerjan, Lemoyne de Forges, and Kunreuther, 2012). 
For example, Greenberg, Lahr, and Mantell (2007) suggest a collaborative strategic planning 
analysis for federal and state governments.  
 
Thus, it is necessary to ensure the ability of private insurance to deal with increasing losses from 
catastrophes. Our study adds to the extant literature that investigates how insurers can manage the 
risks and costs associated with catastrophic losses.  
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Managing risk is important for many parties: for citizens and enterprises that experience natural 
disasters; for private insurers who insure them; and for public policy makers who devise 
appropriate policies. Properly understanding catastrophic risks will help individuals and 
companies better protect their homes and businesses. In addition, a good understanding of natural 
disaster risks is useful for insurance firms that manage the risk. Furthermore, it is helpful for 
governments that complete the risk-control system as a whole. For instance, governments might 
choose to reimburse citizens, in part, for catastrophic losses when citizens are insufficiently insured. 
On the other hand, catastrophe insurance provided by the private sector can form a meaningful 
part of broader national strategies that deal with the increasing threats and costs of catastrophes 
(see Hagendorff, Hagendorff, and Keasey, 2015). 
 
Our study aims to investigate the impact of hurricanes, as an anticipated natural disaster, on the 
premium incomes and stock prices of property and casualty insurers in the U.S. Our analyses 
address several research questions: Do hurricanes positively or negatively influence future 
premium income? How do the stock prices of property and casualty insurers react to catastrophic 
events? How do hurricanes affect insurance companies, based on their direct and indirect exposure 
to the event? How long do the effects last? Is there an industry-wide contagion effect because of 
catastrophic events?  
 
Our sample consists of forty-seven publicly traded insurance firms in the U.S. and the three most 
serious hurricanes during the period from 2006 to 2014. The three hurricanes are broken down into 
150 state-level hazards, including twenty-seven states that were directly affected by the disasters, 
twenty-seven states that were close-by, and ninety-six states that were unaffected. For each firm, 
we match the premium written in a given state with our classification of hurricane areas. We use 
direct premiums written to measure whether insurers have property and casualty insurance 
business in a given state. Then, we calculate the insurer’s proportional exposure to a given 
hurricane. Loss figures for each hurricane are from the National Center for Environmental 
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Information of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Premiums written and 
losses incurred in the homeowner line of business are from Bloomberg. All accounting data are 
from Compustat. 
 
We investigate whether hurricanes positively or negatively influence insurers. In addition, we 
examine whether the insurers’ premium income and/or stock price returns are affected by the 
existence of exposure and the degree of exposure to a given disaster. In other words, we test 
whether direct vs. indirect exposure to a disaster affects the stock performance among insurers 
differently. Lastly, we examine the relationship between a series of insurer/hurricane 
characteristics and insurers’ cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
Our study addresses a gap in the literature: there is no paper as detailed as ours that investigates 
insurance companies’ exposure to hurricanes and how it affects their premium income and stock 
price returns. Natural disasters have been examined before. However, most prior studies focus on 
insurers’ stock prices, not their premium changes. In addition, most prior studies do not consider 
the characteristics of insurers and hurricanes, and their conclusions are not consistent. Our paper 
meaningfully contributes to the current literature on this topic.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the 
effects of catastrophes on insurance companies and other related industries. The third section 
presents the data and variables and discusses the methodology. The fourth section provides the 
results of our univariate and multivariate analyses. The fifth section tests the robustness of our 
results. The last section presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1992) were the first to examine two opposing hypotheses regarding 
the effects of natural hazards on insurance firm value. They argue that “rapid depletion of surplus 
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accounts following a catastrophe may cause investors to discount property-liability insurer stock 
values” and that “insurers benefit from an isolated catastrophic event because of subsequent 
increased consumer or institutional demand” (see Shelor, Anderson, and Cross, 1992). Their 
results support the second hypothesis. After an earthquake, property-liability insurers’ stock values 
tend to increase. 
 
The negative impact is easy to understand; insurers are responsible for paying a large amount of 
money to policyholders due to natural disasters. As a result, insurance companies’ stocks are likely 
to do poorly after a hurricane. However, the empirical literature also provides other findings. 
According to Cagle and Harrington (1995), the supply of insurance is an increasing function of the 
insurer’s capital. Higher costs of capital and solvency requirements limit the ability of insurers to 
provide insurance, including policy renewals and insurance for new coverage (see Winter, 1991, 
1994; Gron, 1994; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Cummins and Lewis, 2003; Chen, Doerpinhaus, 
Lin, and Yu, 2008). After natural disasters, the capital of insurance firms could decrease, thus the 
supply of insurance may decrease. Consequently, the relation between supply and demand could 
increase premiums. From another point of view, due to natural disasters, the demand for insurance 
from previously uninsured customers could increase, which would increase premiums. 
Furthermore, these two effects are likely to be influenced by regulations. For example, regulators 
may allow insurance firms to raise premiums but control the magnitude of the increase. Thus, the 
net effect should depend on the strengths of the two opposite effects. 
 
Similarly, Chen, Doerpinghaus, Lin, and Yu (2008) propose two effects: a claim effect and a 
growth effect. The claim effect is defined as the impact of unexpected losses on insurers’ short-run 
profitability. The authors argue that the growth effect, on the other hand, is a growth opportunity. 
If price increases dominate quantity reductions of issued coverage, insurers’ profitability increases. 
The claim effect could be a short-term phenomenon, resulting from insufficient premiums before 
catastrophic losses, while the growth effect could be a long-term effect, because of insurance 
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supply reductions and risk updating. Their results suggest evidence of a claim effect after 
catastrophic losses. The growth effect, however, is less obvious. 
 
Unlike Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1992), Angbazo and Narayanan (1996) find that Hurricane 
Andrew had a large negative effect on insurance stocks, which was ameliorated to some extent by 
a small positive effect. Furthermore, the hurricane affected the industry as a whole, whether or not 
the respective firms had any claim exposure in the hurricane-affected states. Approximately two 
weeks after Andrew, on September 9, 1992, the Florida insurance commission issued a warning 
that regulators would not permit any unjustified rate increases in the wake of Hurricane Andrew. 
Given this warning, the authors find that this regulatory event also had industry-wide contagion 
effects. 
 
However, Lamb’s (1995) results show that the market efficiently interprets the information 
generated by hurricanes and distinguishes property-liability insurers based on the existence and 
magnitude of insurance policies written. Indeed, Andrew had a significant negative effect on the 
stock prices of property-liability insurers with direct premiums written in Florida or Louisiana, 
while unexposed firms sustained no significant price response. 
 
The type of natural disaster itself may be at the root of the differing results reported in the prior 
empirical literature. Earthquakes, for example, cannot be anticipated in the same way as hurricanes. 
Therefore, anticipation itself may cause different results regarding hurricanes. The extent of loss 
is a further consideration. Under the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, Andrew was the second most 
costly hurricane in the U.S., based on the estimated insured losses and damages for a category five 
hurricane. 
 
Three years later, Lamb’s (1998) findings show that results vary, even when focusing on only one 
type of catastrophe. Hurricane Hugo and Hurricane Andrew produced dramatically different 
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market reactions for property and causality insurance companies. Insurers were unaffected by 
Hurricane Hugo, despite the existence of exposure and their degree of exposure in North and South 
Carolina. Hurricane Andrew, however, only had a significant negative impact for insurers with 
premium business in Florida or Louisiana. The market also discriminates based on the magnitude 
of a hurricane. Furthermore, in the case of Andrew, the market discriminated among insurers 
according to their degree of exposure. It is worth noting that the significant negative response 
produced by Hurricane Andrew was concentrated during the two days after the hurricane hit, 
demonstrating that the information produced by Andrew was quickly digested by the market.  
 
Hagendorff, Hagendorff, and Keasey (2015) examine whether mega-catastrophes significantly 
affect the performance of insurers and whether different types of mega-catastrophes have different 
impacts. Their sample consists of fifty-seven publicly traded property and liability (P&L) insurers 
in the U.S. and nineteen mega-catastrophes that are broken down into 191 state-level catastrophes 
during the period from 1996 to 2010. By studying the share price responses of insurance firms to 
catastrophic events, they conclude that the impact of mega-catastrophes on insurers has not been 
too damaging. To be specific, the exact impact of a catastrophe depends on the nature of the event 
and the degree of competition within the insurance market, because less competition allows 
insurers to reimburse catastrophe losses through adjustments to premiums. Overall, they conclude 
that insurance firms in the U.S. can manage the risks and costs of mega-catastrophes. 
 
Cummins, Doherty, and Lo (2002) suggest that the property-liability industry could sustain a 
mega-catastrophe with damages of up to $100 billion. Similarly, Chen, Doerpinghaus, Lin, and Yu 
(2008) find that insurers can thrive by providing risk transfers for catastrophic losses.  
 
However, the results from Born and Viscusi (2006) are not as optimistic. They argue that insurance 
companies suffered serious losses as a result of some catastrophes and did not manage their risk 
well. They thus conclude that catastrophic risks can lead to considerable problems for the insurance 
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industry. Both the incurred losses and the loss ratios rise in response to catastrophic events. 
Catastrophes reduce total premiums earned in the affected states. In addition, catastrophes lead to 
a reduction in the net number of firms writing insurance coverage in the states as well as to an 
increase in the probability of exit from the state. 
 
In our research, we examine the influence of natural disasters on insurers; thus, we compare firms’ 
pre-event and post-event performance. However, despite the interesting insights our results offer, 
our study can not address the question whether individuals and companies have taken sufficient 
protective measures before a natural disaster. Serious consequences from catastrophes do not only 
arise from the damage itself. Natural disasters have serious consequences besides those covered 
by insurance; there continue to be physical problems and damage after natural disasters in hazard-
prone areas. Our discussion below briefly reviews the related literature in this area. 
 
Sadowski and Sutter (2005) take the perspective of residents and illustrate that there is an offsetting 
behavior in hazardous areas (see also Peltzman, 1975). Technology and regulations reduce the full 
cost of risky behaviors, thus people will engage in more risky behaviors. Improvements in 
technology can help reduce fatalities over time. If hurricanes are less likely to produce fatalities 
and injuries, living in an exposed area becomes more attractive (see Sadowski and Sutter, 2005). 
Consequently, hurricanes will kill fewer people but will produce more property damage. They offer 
evidence via an analysis of land-falling hurricanes in the United States between 1940 and 1999. 
Their results suggest that reductions in hurricane mortality have a significantly and quantitatively 
large effect on damage in portions of the coast most prone to hurricanes. 
 
Analogously, Kunreuther (1996) and Kunreuther (2006) provide extensive evidence that indicates 
that residents in hazardous areas do not undertake loss prevention measures voluntarily. They 
propose several reasons for this such as underestimating the probability of the disaster occurring, 
budget constraints, myopic behavior by individuals, short time horizons for benefits, and 
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interdependencies with neighbors’ decisions. The author suggests providing incentives – such as 
premium reductions, lower deductibles, and higher limits of coverage – to individuals in hazardous 
areas to encourage them to voluntarily adopt cost effective measures. 
 
In addition, Fronstin and Holtmann (1994) hypothesize that consumers may not pay attention to 
whether a home is structurally sound – built to undergo hurricanes – because of the rising cost of 
construction. 
 
From the perspective of regulations, Fronstin and Holtmann (1994) illustrate that building codes 
appear to have eroded over time. Their results indicate that newer houses (those built after the 
1960s) sustained a greater amount of damage from Hurricane Andrew than houses built earlier, 
ceteris paribus. Burby (2006) advises that appropriate land-use regulations and well-enforced 
building codes should be developed in hazard-prone areas. 
 
Similarly, Kunreuther (1996, 2006) point out that building codes are not always enforced in hazard-
prone areas. Insurance experts have indicated that twenty-five percent of the insured losses from 
Hurricane Andrew could have been prevented through better building code compliance and 
enforcement (see Insurance Research Council and Insurance Institute of Property Loss Reduction, 
1995). A comprehensive insurance system ought to comprise separate programs that include 
insurance coverage, other policy tools, and non-insurance industry parties such as banks and 
financial institutions, builders and contractors, and government agencies. 
 
Regarding the role of government in catastrophes, Grace, Klein, and Liu (2005) discuss whether a 
national plan is better than a private system for the insurance market. They mention that the supply 
and price of reinsurance and related financial instruments will be important factors because they 
can influence the supply and price of homeowners’ insurance. Some insurers prefer to seek 
assistance from the federal government in providing “less expensive” catastrophe reinsurance. 
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Regulators and legislators are motivated to explore other measures to expand the supply of 
insurance and reduce its cost. People hold different views about the feasibility of a national plan, 
or of state, regional, and national catastrophe reinsurance systems. Advocates think that the federal 
government has the ability to provide a more stable, reliable, and less expensive source of 
catastrophe reinsurance over time and geographically. However, opponents believe that private 
reinsurance and financial markets can provide adequate and efficient financing of catastrophe risks 
if they are allowed to do so. The authors express concern that a government program could be 
unfair. Because it would benefit from taxpayer-funded subsidies, it could crowd out private 
reinsurance and keep financial markets from covering catastrophe risks. 
 
Natural disasters affect many industries, not only the insurance industry. There is previous 
literature that examines the impact of natural vulnerabilities in other industries as well; many, such 
as the real estate industry, are affected by catastrophes. Furthermore, some prior literature has 
compared the different consequences of natural disasters among industries.   
 
Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1990) investigate the effects of the California earthquake of October 
17, 1989 on the stock value of firms in the real estate industry. They find that the California 
earthquake produced relevant new information that was transmitted to the market and which was 
reflected in significant negative stock returns among real estate firms operating around San 
Francisco. However, in other areas of California, real estate-related firms were generally 
unaffected by the earthquake. This suggests that the market discriminates among firms based on 
their geographic risk exposure. 
 
In comparison with the real estate industry, Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1992) also examine the 
market response of property-liability insurers operating in the California earthquake zone. In 
contrast, the property-liability industry illustrates a significant positive response to the California 
earthquake. Similarly, Aiuppa, Carney, and Krueger (1993) find a positive response when 
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examining the impact of the Loma Prieta earthquake on property-liability firms’ stock values. 
 
Furthermore, certain researchers devote themselves to finding a better catastrophe risk model or 
conduct research on post-catastrophe consequences in order to improve risk management 
mechanisms. 
 
Cossette, Duchesne, and Marceau (2003) propose a general individual catastrophe risk model that 
allows damage ratios to be random functions of the catastrophe intensity. Yang, Wang, and Chen 
(2008) examine the correlation between catastrophe risk securities and portfolios of other equities 
by analyzing catastrophe effects in the Japanese stock market. They find that there is no significant 
catastrophe effect regarding the Japanese stock market as a whole. The results indicate a significant 
negative correlation between catastrophe losses and the insurance industry’s equity returns or 
abnormal returns. A significant positive correlation exists in the construction industry, but there is 
no significant correlation in the real estate industry. In addition, Cole, Macpherson, and 
McCullough (2010) analyze the impact of housing, insurance, and mitigation characteristics on 
average annual losses using four hurricane loss models.  
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
The extant literature offers two opposing hypotheses that have not been resolved; although much 
of the previous literature has investigated them, the results are inconsistent. Some studies, such as 
Angbazo and Narayanan (1996), conclude that hurricanes have a large negative effect on insurance 
stocks. They investigate Hurricane Andrew, the second costliest hurricane in the United States. In 
contrast, Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1992) find that insurers benefit from isolated catastrophic 
events. Most recently, Hagendorff, Hagendorff, and Keasey (2015) conclude that the impact of 
mega-catastrophes on insurers has not been too damaging. 
 
Do natural disasters bring benefits or heavy losses to insurance companies? When a catastrophe 
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occurs, how do investors expect the insurers’ stock to act in the future? Some hold that disasters 
have definite negative influences because of the large claims and reduced confidence that may 
follow catastrophes. On the other hand, insurance policies for homeowners could attract more 
interest after natural catastrophes. The demand for insurance policies could increase, especially in 
areas where natural disasters are more frequent. In addition, subject to regulatory controls, 
insurance companies may increase premiums for specific insurance contracts, which could help 
increase firm values as well. Thus, our first hypothesis is that natural disasters will have a negative 
effect on insurers. 
 
Second, we investigate whether the existence and degree of exposure affects insurers. Exposed 
insurers are defined as companies providing a large proportion of homeowner insurance in the 
affected areas. Unexposed insurers, on the other hand, represent insurance firms that draw their 
insurance premiums from other states. Does the market demonstrate an ability to discriminate 
based on the existence of exposure or the degree of exposure of property-liability insurers under 
severe catastrophes? If the market has the ability to discriminate, then it may be reasonable to 
expect that insurance companies with more business in hazardous areas will be more severely 
influenced than insurers that conduct their business in other states. Insurance companies supply 
different services according to their geographic area and business line. In addition, different types 
of natural disasters occur in relatively fixed areas. Some insurers supply property-liability contracts 
concentrated in Florida and Louisiana, for example, as the probability of hurricanes in these two 
states is higher than in the central United States. 
 
Conversely, if the magnitude of exposure is not significant, there may no difference among the 
different types of areas. Facing a catastrophe, all insurance companies – no matter whose business 
is in the seriously affected states – could be influenced at the same time. Investors view them as a 
whole industry. For example, Angbazo and Narayanan (1996) find that Hurricane Andrew and 
subsequent regulations significantly affected most insurers, regardless of whether these firms had 
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any claims exposure in the hurricane-affected states. This means that there were industry-wide 
contagion effects.  
 
Although some insurance companies supply insurance policies in the affected areas, not all of them 
provide property-liability insurance, which may also alter results. Similarly, the proportion of 
homeowner’s incomes to total insurance incomes may influence the results. 
 
Therefore, our second hypothesis is that hurricane effects may be influenced by the existence of 
exposure and the magnitude of exposure. In other words, insurers in affected areas and with a large 
property-liability exposure could suffer more from hurricanes than other insurers. Unlike bank 
industry failures (Aharony and Swary, 1983; Swary, 1986) and airline crashes (Barrett, Heuson, 
Kolb, and Schropp, 1987; Davidson, Chandy, and Cross, 1987), there is no contagion effect in the 
insurance industry. 
  
Third, we want to investigate the possible factors that influence the abnormal performance of 
insurers’ stocks. These factors include the insurers’ characteristics and the catastrophe 
characteristics. Regarding the characteristics of catastrophes, and in addition the exposure 
magnitude, we examine the relation between hurricane damages and the insurers’ performance in 
the stock market. Included in the firms’ characteristics are variables such as firm size, Tobin’s Q, 
ROA, the loss ratio related to the homeowner’s line of business, the degree of diversity of the 
insurance lines, and the financial rating of the insurer. 
 
We expect that large firms, firms with higher ROA and Tobin’s Q, and firms with higher ratings 
may manage their risk better and may benefit from in the stock market because they have more 
resources, higher profitability, better investor expectations, and a better financial structure.  
 
Conversely, the loss ratio may negatively influence the stock return of insurers because they bear 
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larger amounts of payments to policyholders. 
 
In light of the diversification of insurance lines, the relationship between abnormal performance 
and diversification is not easy to estimate. More insurance lines may help insurers diversify their 
risk when facing hurricanes because we generally believe that the line of insurance most influenced 
by natural disasters is homeowner coverage and property-liability insurance. On the other hand, 
investors may regard the insurance company as a whole no matter how much business is in the 
homeowner line, or how many lines of business it has. In addition, there might be interaction 
among the different kinds of insurance coverage held by one policyholder such as an owner of a 
small furniture factory. After a serious hurricane, both his home and the factory could be damaged. 
His employees could be injured while working in the factory. Several insurance policies could be 
involved simultaneously in this event. However, there may be a combination effect from these two 
possibilities because there is a joint impact produced by the positive and negative effects. 
Hagendorff, Hagendorff, and Keasey (2015) examine the relationship between the diversification 
of lines and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). However, they find no clear result. We will 
examine this factor by calculating a 1-Herfindahl index. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
First, we select the target hurricanes as the events. According to the National Centers for 
Environmental Information of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, all of the 
billion-dollar hurricanes affecting the U.S. occurred during the period from 2006 to 2014. We 
choose three top hurricanes whose adjusted cost is higher than $10 billion including Sandy (2012), 
Irene (2011), and Ike (2008). They have caused estimated costs of 67, 14 and 33 billion USD, 
respectively. Detailed information on these three hurricanes is found in Table 1.Table 1also shows 
the state classifications. The three hurricanes are broken down into 150 state-level hazards, 
including twenty-seven states that were directly affected by the disasters, twenty-seven states that 
were close-by, and ninety-six states that were unaffected. 
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We then define the insurers used in this research. We obtain the names of the top one hundred 
insurance companies in the United States from Bloomberg. It provides premiums detailed for each 
state in the U.S. and in each insurance line. We use direct premiums written, defined as the 
aggregate amount of recorded originated premiums, other than reinsurance, written during the year, 
whether collected or not, at the close of the year, plus retrospective audit premium collections, 
after deducting all return premiums (defined by A.M. Bests). We use the premium to identify the 
geographic areas of the insurers’ businesses and to observe the changes in premiums due to the 
events. Bloomberg also supplies the losses incurred in the homeowner line of business. 
 
We check all firms through Bloomberg, Google Financial, and on each company’s website to verify 
whether the companies are private or not. Sample firms are required to have accounting and share 
price information on CRSP and Compustat, respectively. Some of the insurance companies are 
listed in Europe and Australia. After eliminating the firms with missing data and those listed 
outside of the U.S., 49 insurers were left. We also double checked the SIC codes for the remainder 
of the companies. Based on the SIC codes from Compustat, two companies were eliminated. They 
are Berkshire Hathaway with SIC code 9997, and Wells Fargo & Co with SIC code 6020. These 
two companies do have insurance businesses; however, considering that their businesses are very 
comprehensive, it would not be possible to assess the repercussions of these events on their 
property-liability insurance lines. Therefore, we eliminated them from the sample. Finally, 47 
publicly traded insurance firms in the U.S. make up the sample. The full list of companies can be 
found in the APPENDIX, Table 2.  
 
We will run the cross sectional analysis based on daily return of the event study using market 
model, which is widely used in the studies by Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1992), and Angbazo 
and Narayanan (1996), etc. 
 
The market model is used to indicate the reaction of a stock price to catastrophic events. Assume 
15 
 
that stock returns follow a single factor market model, 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the rate of return of the common stock of firm j on day t. 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the rate of return 
on the CRSP equally-weighted index return on day t. Many previous studies on the implications 
of catastrophic events for insurers have employed the CRSP equally-weighted index. 𝜀𝑗𝑡  is a 
random variable which has an expected value of zero and is assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝑅𝑚𝑡, 
not autocorrelated and homoscedastic. 
 
𝛽𝑗  is a parameter that measures the change in 𝑅𝑗𝑡  given a change in 𝑅𝑚𝑡 , and indicates 
sensitivity of 𝑅𝑗𝑡 to the market index. 𝛼𝑗 represents the market independent rate of return on 
firm j. The coefficients 𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂?are estimated based on ordinary least squares. 
 
Abnormal return for the common stock of firm j on day t is defined as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (𝛼?̂? + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑡). 
 
We merge the abnormal return over the event windows to obtain the cumulative abnormal return: 




where 𝑡1 is the start day of one of the specific event window and 𝑡2 is the end of the specific 
event window. We define six event windows, window (-5, -1), window (-1, 1), window (0, 1), 
window (0, 5), window (0, 10), and window (0, 20). We include the pre-windows and post-
windows.  
 
We define the minimum and maximum estimation lengths at 3 days and 255 days, respectively. 
The estimation period ends 10 days before the event date. Then, we set the whole event period 




We regard the landfall day of the hurricane as the event date, as shown in Table 1. If the event 
occurs on a weekend day, we use the next trading day as the event day instead. In particular, on 
Monday, October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall near Brigantine, New Jersey, with 
winds of approximately 80 mph (130km/h). Because of its severity, the stock market closed on 
Monday and Tuesday. Therefore, we use Wednesday, October 31 as the event date.  
 
By running the event study, we get a preliminary image of the abnormal performance of insurers 
due to serious hurricanes and investigate the net effect of catastrophes on insurers. The question 
therefore is: Will the overall outcome favor the positive or the negative hypothesis? 
 
We define the affected areas, close-by areas, and unaffected areas for each firm by matching the 
homeowner insurance premiums of each company with the states affected by each hurricane. For 
example, for one insurer (ACE LTD) under one hurricane (Sandy 2012), if there was a positive 
premium in the homeowner line in one specific state (NY) in 2012, it means that the insurer (ACE 
LTD) had homeowner business in that state (NY) in 2012. Then, we check which area the specific 
state (NY) belongs to for that hurricane (Sandy 2012): an affected, close-by, or unaffected area. If 
Hurricane Sandy struck the state (NY) in 2012, then the state (NY) is defined as one of the affected 
areas for the insurer (ACE LTD). 
 
After matching all hurricane areas with all insurers, we calculate the magnitude of exposure for 
each insurer. Premium income information is from Bloomberg. We use direct premiums written, 
defined as the aggregate amount of recorded originated premiums, other than reinsurance, written 
during the year, whether collected or not, at the close of the year, plus retrospective audit premium 
collections, after deducting all return premiums. Exposure_affected_H is the ratio of homeowner 
premiums earned in the affected state(s) to total homeowner premiums earned. 
Exposure_affected_T is measured as the ratio of homeowner premiums earned in the affected 
state(s) to total premiums earned. Similarly, we calculate the exposure for close-by states. 
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Proportion_Home is the ratio of total homeowner premiums earned to total premiums earned. In 
other words, Exposure_T is the interaction item (X1X2), calculated as the product of Exposure_H 
(X1) and Proportion_Home (X2). Estimated cost caused, representing the total estimated damage 
(in billions USD) caused by a given hurricane, is from the National Centers for Environmental 
Information of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  
 
All accounting data are from Compustat. We use the log of total assets to measure the size of the 
insurer. Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities 
divided by the book value of assets. ROA is the ratio of pretax profits to total assets. To define loss 
ratio, we apply the log of loss ratio defined as total losses incurred in the homeowner line of 
business. Linedivers, a measure of line diversification, is calculated as the sum of the squared 
percentage of insurance premiums earned in each business line to the total premiums earned in all 
property-liability lines. Finally, we use the rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s to measure the 
financial situation of insurers: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating 
assigned by Standard & Poor’s is A or better; otherwise, it is 0. Detailed definitions of all variables 
are shown in the APPENDIX, Table 3.  
 
In the following analysis section, we first run the univariate analysis to make sure whether the 
premium changes in homeowner lines are different from zero in the event year, 1 year after the 
event year, and 2 years after the event year. By doing so, we can investigate whether or not 
hurricanes bring serious influences to insurers as well as whether those influences are short or long 
term.  
 
Then, in order to do a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is discrimination 
among different types of states, we run mean and median tests for premium changes in the event 
year, 1 year after the event year, and 2 years after the event year. If there are significant differences 
between the three kinds of areas, it means there is recognition among the various areas after 
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hurricanes. Alternately, if there are no significant differences, it may suggest that a contagion effect 
exists in the insurance industry when facing hurricanes. Furthermore, if there is a contagion effect, 
how long will it last? We can also get a basic answer from this test. At least, we would have a look 
at whether there is a difference in results by year. We may imagine that there is a significant 
difference in the event year, after which the significance may decrease.  
 
In addition, we go further with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the relations 
between several factors and CARs.  
 
Based on Hagendorff, Hagendorff, and Keasey (2015), we estimate the model as the following: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[𝑥 , 𝑦] = 𝛼 + 𝛽′𝑰𝑪 + 𝜸′𝑯𝑪 + 𝜺, 
where CAR[x, y] is the market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over different event 
windows. IC is a vector of the insurers’ characteristics in the year before the event, including firm 
size, Tobin’s Q, ROA, loss ratio, lines diversification, and financial rating. HC is a vector of the 
hurricanes’ characteristics, including exposure variables and hurricane losses. We include insurer 
characteristics and hurricane characteristics separately first, and then run the whole model with 
both of them. 
 
To be more specific, we construct three sub-models. First, we look at each hurricane’s 
characteristics: 
CAR[x, y] = α + β
1
× Exposure_affected_T + β
2
× Exposure_closeby_T + β
3
× Loss + ε. 
 
The variable exposure links the insurance policies of insurers to the hurricane’s landfall 
characteristics. We include two variables, Exposure_affected_T and Exposure_closeby_T, to 
represent the three types of areas during hurricanes (affected, close-by, and unaffected). In this 




Second, we look at the insurers’ characteristics: 
CAR[x, y] = α + β
1
× FirmSize + β
2
× TOBQ + β
3
× ROA + β
4





× HighRating + ε. 
 
Last, we include all characteristics in one model: 
CAR[x, y] = α + β
1
× Exposure_affected_T + β
2
× Exposure_closeby_T + β
3
× Loss + β
4
× Firm Size + β
5
× TOBQ + β
6
× ROA + β
7





× High Rating + ε. 
 
In the basic regression section, we run three sub-models for the six event windows. 
 
Based on these results, we run additional analyses. For example, we add year and firm fixed effects 
and consider the problem of residuals and outliers in the additional analysis section.  
 
OLS regression assumes that the residuals are independent. However, our dataset includes data for 
47 publicly traded insurance firms in the U.S. and for three years: 2008, 2011 and 2012. It is 
possible that the firm performance in each year may not be independent, and this could lead to 
residuals that are not independent over years. On the other hand, all companies in the insurance 
industry may interact, no matter in which year. Therefore, in our additional analyses, we use 
the cluster option in SAS to control for the fact that the observations are clustered by year and 
insurer. We further estimate heteroscedasticity consistent with p-values, in order to get a better 
understanding of the relationship between hurricanes and insurers’ firm performance.  
 
Furthermore, robust regressions are an alternative to least squares regressions when data are 
contaminated with outliers or influential observations. Therefore, in our additional analyses, we 
also employ robust regressions to treat outliers. The robust regression method most commonly 
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used today is Huber M estimation, which we also use in this research. Huber’s (1973) M estimation 
is the simplest approach both computationally and theoretically.  
 
As there are interaction variables (X1X2) which have been introduced, we will conduct robustness 
tests to assess whether the results are consistent by including the interaction items (X1X2) in the 
models. The detailed model is shown as the following: 
CAR [x, y] = α + β
1
× Exposure_affected_T + β
2
× Exposure_affected_H + β
3
×  Proportion_Home × Exposure_closeby_T + β
5
× Exposure_closeby_H + β
6
× Loss + β
7
× Firm Size + β
8
× TOBQ + β
9
× ROA + β
10
× Lossratio + β
11
× Linedivers + β
12
× High Rating + ε. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we will check the results of univariate and multivariate analysis that were 
introduced in the methodology section.  
 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
In this subsection, we examine the effect of hurricanes on premium income and shareholder wealth, 
respectively.  
 
5.1.1 Effect of hurricanes on premium income 
We calculate the premium changes and combine our three sample events by year: the event year 
(year 0), and 1 and 2 years pre-event and post-event. The values in pre-event years are calculated 
as 100/(1 + premium change (% )t−1,t).Similarly, the values for the post-event years (year 1 
and year 2) are calculated as 100 × (1 + premium change (% )t−1,t). After these calculations, 
we set the premiums in the event year as the base point (100) for the three types of areas in order 
to get a better comparison. 
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Figure 1 shows the trend of premium changes from 2 years before to 2 years after hurricanes, with 
the datum equals to 100 in the event year. Before the event year (year 0), property and casualty 
premium income does not change much, especially in the years (-2) and (-1). After hurricanes, the 
premiums written have increased at different levels for the three types of areas. The result supports 
the hypothesis that insurers could benefit from serious hurricanes. However, there is no obvious 
discrimination among different types of states.  
 
Among the three types of areas, the premiums in the close-by area have jumped most obviously, 
from 100 to 109. We can understand that the residents who live in close-by areas have witnessed 
the serious consequences of the catastrophic events. They prefer more insurance to guarantee their 
property and casualties, therefore the demand for insurance will increase and insurers would 
benefit a great deal. However, the premiums in the affected areas are not as high as those in the 
close-by areas, because both insurers and policyholders need time to recover. That is, they need 
time to make claims, reconstruct, and buy insurance for new properties. The insurers also need 
time to manage a considerable number of claims. The net increase of premiums could not be as 
much as it is in close-by areas.  
 
In year 1, the premiums in affected and unaffected states are very close, with a value of 103. Over 
time, the premiums indifferent areas converge to the same amount. The value for the unaffected 
states has grown higher than it is in the affected states. However, that is just a general and simple 
result that could be disordered. We will statistically analyze this further in the following sections. 
 
First, we test whether the premium changes during and after the event year are different from zero 
for the three areas, based on their exposure. Table 4 provides all the premium changes that are 
significantly different from zero. After hurricanes, insurers in all areas have a significant premium 
increase. In the event year, the differences in the three types of areas are above 8% and significant. 
The year after the event, the difference in close-by states remains greater than 8% at a highly 
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significant level. In addition, Table 4 shows a downward trend in the magnitude of differences. 
After a long period of recovery, premium incomes tend to stabilize. The result is consistent with 
Chen, Doerpinghaus, Lin, and Yu (2008): After hurricanes, there are growth opportunities because 
price increases could dominate quantity reductions of issued coverage. Insurers’ profitability 
increases, leading to better growth opportunities.  
 
Subsequently, we perform pairwise comparisons of premium changes between areas. As shown in 
Table 5, Panel A provides a comparison between affected and close-by states, Panel B compares 
affected and unaffected states, and Panel C provides a comparison between close-by and 
unaffected states. Premium changes are significantly different between any two areas in the event 
year but only a few of them are significant in the following year. Therefore, the hurricanes may 
not bring many influences or distinguish results over a long period. In Panel A, we compare 
affected and close-by areas and get results similar to Figure 1. Premiums in close-by areas have a 
larger increase than those in affected areas. For example, in the event year, the mean premium 
change in close-by states is more than 2% higher than it is in affected states. In addition, premiums 
in affected areas have the smallest growth. Unexpectedly, premiums in the unaffected states have 
the largest increase. In the event year, premium changes in the unaffected states are 1% higher than 
in close-by states. 
 
5.1.2 Effect of hurricanes on shareholder wealth 
In this subsection, we examine changes in the market values of insurers in response to catastrophes. 
Table 6 reposts abnormal stock price performance with our samples in the various event windows. 
Only in the pre-event window (window (-5, -1)) is there a negative mean cumulative abnormal 
return. After that, for the post-event windows, all the mean CARs are significantly positive, 
ranging from 1.45% on day 1 to 5.55% twenty days after the event date. Furthermore, the degree 
of increase becomes bigger and bigger over time. Based on these results, we can conclude that the 
expected benefits of potential premium increases after catastrophes could outweigh the substantial 
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loss of reimbursements to policyholders. Moreover, from Table 6, we can see that, in general, more 
insurers enjoy positive CARs instead of negative CARs. For instance, in window (0, 10), only 50 
out of 137 insurers suffer negative abnormal performance, significant at the 1% significance level. 
In the following sections, we will continue to seek the factors related to the market’s reaction to 
serious natural disasters. 
 
This result is consistent with Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1992). They conclude that insurers 
benefit from an isolated catastrophic event because of subsequent increased consumer or 
institutional demand. As mentioned in our section on the literature review, according to Cagle and 
Harrington (1995), the supply of insurance is an increasing function of the insurer’s capital. Higher 
costs of capital and solvency requirements limit the ability of insurers to provide insurance, 
including policy renewals and issuance of new coverage (see Winter, 1991, 1994; Gron, 1994; 
Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Cummins and Lewis, 2003; Chen, Doerpinhaus, Lin, and Yu, 
2008).After natural disasters, the capital of insurance firms could decrease, so the supply of 
insurance could decrease. Then, premiums could increase because of the relation between supply 
and demand. Similarly, Hagendorff, Hagendorff, and Keasey (2015) illustrate that the impact of 
mega-catastrophes on insurers has not been too damaging. However, this is opposite to the findings 
of Angbazo and Narayanan (1996). They find that Hurricane Andrew had a large negative effect 
on insurance stocks that was ameliorated to some extent by a smaller positive effect. In addition, 
Born and Viscusi (2006) illustrate that insurance companies suffer seriously from the catastrophic 
event rather than manage risk well. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the trend in CARs from one week before to one week after the event. We can see 
that, between 2 days and 1 day before the event, there is an obvious decrease in CARs. After the 
event, CARs exhibit a generally positive trend. This could be because of the weather forecast. 
Before landfall, a hurricane forms in the ocean. It may always change over time. The direction, 
intensity, power or any other factors may change. As Lamb (1998) explains, the actual path that a 
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hurricane will take remains largely an unpredictable event, despite the existence of sophisticated 
technology. Although the technology has improved over time (for example, hurricanes are tracked 
by satellites), the ultimate path and resulting damage are still uncertain. Additionally, in our 
research, we define the event date as the landfall date. However, landfall could be forecast when a 
hurricane comes close. Thus, this estimation could be the reason that the turning point of CARs is 
on day (-1) instead of day 0. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that the positive effects surpass the 
negative effects of hurricanes; insurers could gain advantages from catastrophes. Another 
explanation could be the quick market reaction. This result is similar to Lamb’s (1998) 
investigation of market efficiency around Hurricane Hugo and Hurricane Andrew. He finds that 
the significant negative response produced by Hurricane Andrew was concentrated during the two 
days after landfall, illustrating that the information produced by Hurricane Andrew was quickly 
incorporated by the market. 
 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
We apply multivariate regression analyses to assess the findings in the univariate analysis and 
examine the factors affecting market reactions of insurers. 
 
Table 7 in the APPENDIX shows the correlation between independent variables to check the 
correlation between explanation variables. Only between firm size and high financial rating is there 
a significant positive relation with coefficient 0.58. For the others, there is no substantial 
multicollinearity problem among the independent variables.  
 
5.2.1 Basic regression results 
In this subsection, we report the results of basic OLS regressions of CARs in different event 
windows, shown in Table 8, in order to find the relationships between insurers’ abnormal 
performance due to hurricanes and insurers characteristics. First, for the exposure variables, there 
are not many significant results. This may illustrate that there is no distinguishing impact on 
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insurers in types of areas when facing serious hurricanes. Angbazo and Narayanan (1996), find 
that Hurricane Andrew had a large negative effect on insurance stocks. More important, it is an 
industry-wide contagion effect since it significantly affected most insurers, whether or not these 
firms have any claims exposure in the hurricane-affected states. 
 
However, the severity of the hurricanes massively affects abnormal performance. There is a 
negative relationship between loss caused by hurricanes and stock price reactions. Similarly, Chen, 
Doerpinghaus, Lin, and Yu (2008) demonstrate that loss estimates are an important determinant of 
the short-term position. Catastrophic claims have a negative effect on the short-term, which is the 
claim effect. We understand that the more severe the hurricanes are the more hesitant investors 
could remain. A more serious hurricane probably brings more damage to property, which could 
potentially lead to more reimbursement payments. 
 
Regarding insurance companies, in the pre-event and in the very short period of the post-event 
window (1 day after the event date), firm size is negatively related to abnormal returns, which is 
the opposite of our expectation. Big companies do not gain more confidence from investors; they 
may need to pay large amounts to their policyholders quickly, thereby decreasing their assets, 
which is not good for financial liquidity, new investment, or growth in the future. In addition, firm 
size does not represent all the operation circumstances of insurers. They may not obtain a good 
standard that would allow them to raise capital at low cost. However, this relationship is not very 
significant in the post-event windows. 
 
ROA is positively connected to abnormal returns, which supports our expectation. ROA indicates 
the percentage of how profitable a company’s assets are in generating revenue. After hurricanes, 
indeed, insurers would face more claims. The ability to get more profit with a certain level of asset 
would make investors have more confidence in the insurer in the future. Last, lines diversity is 
negatively in relation to abnormal returns in the post-event windows. If an insurer has various lines 
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of insurance, it may face more problems when natural disasters occur. There might be interaction 
between different lines of insurance, especially for the same client, as seen in the previous example 
of home insurance and business insurance. Alternately, resources as a whole such as assets, capital, 
or knowledge could be divided into other lines of insurance that are not as influenced by disasters. 
However, the results are not significant in all event windows. 
 
5.2.2 Additional analysis 
In the first subsection of additional analysis, we fix the year and insurer effects. We fix both effects 
for the year, the firm, and then both combined. We fix both effects for the year, the firm, and then 
both combined. The results are shown in Table 9. Consistent with our findings regarding regression, 
ROA has a significantly positive relationship with abnormal returns. It supports that investors 
could have good expectations for the future, depending on a high ROA. They trust the ability of 
such insurance companies to be profitable. Continually, big companies have difficulties gaining 
more confidence from investors. Firm size has a negative relationship to stock market reactions. 
Furthermore, in terms of hurricane losses, it is negatively related to CARs. 
 
As a whole, the degrees of significance decrease over time. There are no long time influences on 
abnormal performance due to hurricanes. Especially in the pre-event window (-5, -1), 
Exposure_closeby_T is significantly and positively related to CARs. This supports the hypothesis 
that insurers in nearby states could benefit from hurricanes. Individuals and companies have 
experience based on consequences. They prefer to protect and insure their properties more. The 
demand for insurance increases, premiums could potentially increase, and expectations may 
become promising. However, this is not significant during post-event windows and we will 
continue to examine that in the following analysis. Still, in the pre-event window (-5, -1), high 
financial rating is positively related to CARs. It illustrates that just a few days before hurricanes, 
investors could expect that more highly rated insurers are likely to manage risk well and benefit 
from it. They have better financial situations with which to face a hurricane’s attacks. However, 
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the result is no longer clear in the post-event windows. 
 
Considering the possible problem of residuals, Table 10 exhibits the results of a series of CAR 
regressions in different event windows relative to insurer and hurricane characteristics under 
cluster year and cluster firm. Heteroscedasticity consistent p-value for the coefficients is reported 
in parentheses. In pre-event windows, Exposure_affected_T negatively influences CARs. 
Exposure_closeby_T, however, positively influences CARs. In affected states, investors devalue 
those insurers in the aftermath of catastrophic events because the insurers need to face potential 
reimbursement payments to policyholders. Higher loss exposures lead to less favorable stock price 
performance (see Hagendorff, Hagendorff, and Keasey, 2015). This is also consistent with 
Angbazo and Narayanan (1996). They illustrate that Hurricane Andrew had a large negative effect 
on insurance stocks that was ameliorated to some extent by a smaller positive effect. Furthermore, 
the result shows discrimination among exposure states to a certain extent. However, this is not 
clear in the post-event windows. 
 
In the last subsection of additional analysis, we run robust regressions in order to tolerate the 
outliers in our dataset. We can see from Table 11 that more significant results show in the variables 
of exposures, which support the findings in the previous subsections. Exposure_affected_T 
negatively affects CARs while Exposure_closeby_T positively influences CARs. In the affected 
states, the negative influence from hurricanes outweighs the positive effect; in contrast, insurers 
benefit from hurricanes in the close-by states. Consistent with the results in earlier sections, loss 
has a negative relationship with CARs. The more serious a hurricane is, the more damage it brings 
to property, which potentially could lead to more reimbursement payments. 
 
Tobin’s Q is positively related to CARs. High Tobin’s Q encourages companies to invest more in 
capital because the companies are “worth” more than the price paid for them, which reflects the 
confidence of investors. Therefore, higher Tobin’s Q leads to higher abnormal returns. However, 
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Hagendorff, Hagendorff, and Keasey (2015) find an opposite result. They argue that loss events 
leading to internal capital depletion are more severe for firms with strong growth prospects than 
for firms whose market value is more dependent on assets in place. That is because capital for new 
investments is more important for growth-orientated firms. 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
As introduced in the data and methodology section, we define Exposure_affected_T as the ratio of 
homeowner premiums earned in the affected state(s) to total premiums earned, and 
Exposure_closeby_T as the ratio of homeowner premiums earned in the close-by state(s) to total 
premiums earned. These two variables are the interaction items (X1X2). Exposure_affected_T is 
the product of Exposure_affected_H (the ratio of homeowner premiums earned in the affected 
state(s) to total homeowner premiums earned) and Proportion_Home (the ratio of total homeowner 
premiums earned to total premiums earned). Exposure_closeby_T is the product of 
Exposure_closeby_H (the ratio of homeowner premiums earned in the close-by state(s) to total 
homeowner premiums earned) and Proportion_Home.  
 
In the robustness test, we ran the regression with the interaction variables ( X1X2 ) and the 
composition variables (X1 and X2) at the same time. In general, Table 12 shows that the results 
are consistent with the findings in the previous sections. Among different types of states, there is 
not a large difference. Only the pre-event window (-5, -1) distinguishes the exposures of insurers. 
Loss from hurricanes always has a negative influence on insurers’ stock prices. Similarly, big 
companies do not attract more confidence from investors. In contrast, the ability to make profits 
from assets can help insurers gain more from hurricane events.  
 
In order to confirm the yearly differences, we ran the regressions by year as well. There are indeed 
big differences in sensitivity to insurers’ and hurricanes’ characteristics among the years 2008, 
2011, and 2012. In 2008, CARs have more significant relationships with insurers’ characteristics. 
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The signs of the coefficients of the variables are consistent with the findings above. Alternately, 
CARs are more sensitive to hurricane characteristics in 2011, and even more soin 2012. Insurers 
with higher exposure in the affected states are hit by hurricanes more seriously. The considerable 
differences among years may be one of the reasons that we cannot get better and more significant 
results and conclusions from our analysis. Consequently, we have a general picture but cannot 
make a definitive conclusion. With a limited sample size, there are not enough observations for 
each model when running the regressions by year. Therefore, we do not report the table showing 
regression by year.  
 
However, based on Lamb (1998), there is support indicating big variances among hurricanes. He 
finds that Hurricane Hugo and Hurricane Andrew produced dramatically different market reactions 
for property and causality insurance companies. Insurers were unaffected by Hurricane Hugo, in 
spite of exposure in North or South Carolina. Hurricane Andrew, however, generated a significant 
negative impact only on insurers with premium business in Florida or Louisiana.  
 
7. Conclusions and Discussion 
Our results show that insurers in all areas (i.e. insurers that operate in affected, close-by, and 
unaffected states) experience a significant premium increase after hurricanes. Premium changes 
are significantly different between any two types of areas in an event year, but only a few of them 
are significant in the following year. Consequently, while hurricanes appear to affect the short-
term premium income of insurance companies, they may not influence premium income in the 
long term. In addition, we find that insurers in close-by areas appear to benefit more than those in 
affected areas, possibly as a result of a wake-up call stemming from having closely avoided a 
disaster. 
 
In light of shareholder wealth, we conclude that the increase in expected benefits from potential 
premiums after catastrophes outweighs the substantial losses insurers incur due to reimbursements 
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to policyholders. However, while there are no obvious distinguishing results among areas when 
facing serious hurricanes, there is a certain degree of discrimination due to differing magnitudes 
of exposure. Insurers with business in close-by states benefit from hurricanes. In contrast, insurers 
in affected states suffer negative consequences. This is not significant in all event windows, 
especially in the long term, but is fairly consistent in the short term. 
 
The severity of hurricanes greatly affects the abnormal stock price performance of insurance 
companies. There is a negative relationship between the losses caused by hurricanes and stock 
price reactions. We understand that the more severe the hurricane is, the more hesitant investors 
tend to remain. A more serious hurricane likely causes higher property damages, which potentially 
lead to higher reimbursement payments. 
 
Large companies do benefit from potential investor confidence and even suffer negative 
consequences due to hurricanes. ROA has a significantly positive effect on abnormal returns. Line 
diversity is negatively related to CARs while Tobin’s Q is positively related to CARs.  
 
As Kunreuther (1996) and Kunreuther (2006) argue, residents in hazard-prone areas do not 
undertake loss-prevention measures voluntarily. Individuals and companies take insufficient 
protective measures. This might weaken the significance of our results. 
 
Future researchers who plan to work in this area are thus encouraged to use more events during a 
longer period to obtain more comprehensive results. However, these efforts may be hindered by 
the fact that data collection is difficult because, at the state level, premium writing is very detailed; 
furthermore, the information is not commonly available. 
 
In order to construct a more comprehensive insurance mechanism that allows for better 
management of catastrophic risks, more efforts ought to be made. We should involve not only 
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private insurance firms, but should also improve industry regulations. We need the participation of 
both private insurers and other parties, including banks and financial institutions, builders and 
contractors, and the government. Even property owners should participate and be encouraged to 
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Figure 1 Effect of Hurricanes on Premium Changes 
 
Note: The figure shows premium changes for states, categorized based on their exposure to a given hurricane. 
Before the event year (year 0), the property and casualty premium income does not change a lot, especially in 
the years (-2) and (-1). After the hurricanes, the premium income exhibits a big increase in all three types of 
areas. Among them, the premium for the close-by area has jumped most obviously. Premium incomes are from 
Bloomberg. We use direct premiums written, defined as the aggregate amount of recorded originated premiums, 
other than reinsurance, written during the year, whether collected or not, at the close of the year, plus 
retrospective audit premium collections, after deducting all return premiums. 
 
Figure 2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Insurers 
 
Note: Figure 2 depicts the trend in CARs from one week before to one week after the event. We can see that, 
between 2 days and 1 day before the event, there is an obvious decrease in CARs. After the event, CARs exhibit 
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Table 1 The Top 3 Hurricanes between 2006 and 2014 











29.10.2012 Sandy MD, DE, 
NJ, NY, 






WA, OR, CA, NV, 
AZ, ID, UT, MT, 
WY, CO, NM, ND, 
SD, NE, KS, TX, 
OK, MN, IA, MO, 
AR, LA, WI, IL, 
KY, TN, MS, AL, 
MI, IN, GA, FL, 
SC, ME, AK, HI 
159 $67 
27.08.2011 Irene NC, VA, 
MD, NJ, 
NY, CT, 





WA, OR, CA, NV, 
AZ, ID, UT, MT, 
WY, CO, NM, ND, 
SD, NE, KS, TX, 
OK, MN, IA, MO, 
AR, LA, WI, IL, 
MS, AL, MI, IN, 
OH, GA, FL, ME, 
AK, HI, KY, TN 
45 $14 
13.09.2008 Ike TX, LA, 















WA, OR, CA, NV, 
AZ, ID, UT, MT, 
WY, CO, NM, ND, 
SD, NE, MN, FL, 
VT, NH, ME, MA, 
CT, RI, AK, HI 
112 $33 
Note: The sample consists of the top hurricanes whose adjusted cost is higher than $ 10 billion. 







Table 2 Sample Firms 
Table 2: Sample Firms (N=47) 
ACE LTD EMC INSURANCE 
GROUP INC 
OLD REPUBLIC INTL 
CORP 
ALLEGHANY CORP EMPLOYERS 
HOLDINGS INC 
PROASSURANCE CORP 





ASSURANCE CO AG 
ERIE INDEMNITY CO -
CL A 
RLI CORP 


































TRAVELERS COS INC 











MARKEL CORP BERKLEY (W R) CORP 
CHUBB CORP MERCURY GENERAL 
CORP 




METLIFE INC XL GROUP PLC 
CNA FINANCIAL CORP NAVIGATORS GROUP 
INC 
  
Note: The sample consists of 47 insurance firms that are publicly traded in the U.S. and that have complete 
information on direct premiums written in various insurance lines on Bloomberg as well historical 




Table 3 Variable Definition 
Table 3: Variable Definition 
  Variable Definition 
Dependent 
variables 
CAR(x, y)  Market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal 
returns over different event windows 
Independent 
variables 
Exposure_affected_H The ratio of homeowner’ premiums earned in 
affected state(s) to total homeowners’ 
premiums earned (%) 
 Exposure_affected_T The ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in 
affected state(s) to total premiums earned (%) 
 Exposure_closeby_H The ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in 
close-by state(s) to total homeowners’ 
premiums earned (%) 
 Exposure_closeby_T The ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in 
close-by state(s) to total premiums earned (%) 
 Proportion_Home The ratio of total homeowners’ insurance 
premiums earned to total premiums earned (%) 
 Loss Estimated total damage caused by a given 
hurricane, adjusted by 2014 CPI ($ billion) 
 Firm Size Log of total assets 
 TOBQ Tobins’s Q measured as the market value of 
equity plus the book value of liabilities, divided 
by the book value of assets 
 ROA The ratio of pretax profits to total assets (%) 
 Lossratio Log of the loss ratio, defined as the total loss 
incurred in the homeowners’ line of business. 
 Linedivers A measure of line diversification, calculated as 
the sum of the squared percentage of insurance 
premiums earned in each business line to the 
total premiums earned in all property-liability 
lines (%) 
  High Rating Dummy variable that equals 1 if the insurer’s 
financial rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s 
is A or better (and 0 otherwise) 
Note: All accounting data are from Compustat. Premium income is from Bloomberg. We use direct 
premiums written, the aggregate amount of recorded originated premiums, other than reinsurance, written 
during the year, whether collected or not, at the close of the year, plus retrospective audit premium 
collections, after deducting all return premiums. The estimated losses caused by each hurricane are from 
the National Centers for Environmental Information of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
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Table 4 T-tests to examine whether premium changes are different from zero 
Table 4: T-tests to examine whether premium changes are different from zero 
 Affected N Close-by N Unaffected N 
Event year 0.0848*** 400 0.0821*** 387 0.0884*** 1088 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  
1 Year after 0.0616*** 529 0.0832*** 515 0.0799*** 1729 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  
2 Years after  0.0293*** 522 0.0541*** 520 0.0626*** 1735 
  (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%level, respectively. 
We test whether the premium changes during and after the event year are different from zero for the three 
areas based on their exposure. All premium changes are significantly different from zero. Premium income 
is from Bloomberg. We use direct premiums written, defined as the aggregate amount of recorded originated 
premiums, other than reinsurance, written during the year, whether collected or not, at the close of the year, 




























Table 5 Difference Tests of Premium Changes by Region 
Table 5: Difference Tests of Premium Changes by Region  
Panel A: Affected vs. Close-by 
  Affected Close-by Test of differences 
    Difference p-value 
Event year N 522 520   
 Mean 0.0293  0.0541  -0.0248*** (<.0001) 
 Median 0.0239  0.0373  -0.0133*** (0.0098) 
1 year after N 529 515   
 Mean 0.0616  0.0832  -0.0216* (0.0528) 
 Median 0.0428  0.0454  -0.0027 (0.4216) 
2 years after  N 400 387   
 Mean 0.0848  0.0821  0.0027 (0.8553) 
  Median 0.0461  0.0431  0.0029 (0.7170) 
Panel B: Affected vs. Unaffected 
  Affected Unaffected Test of differences 
    Difference p-value 
Event year N 522 1735   
 Mean 0.0293  0.0695  -0.0402*** (<.0001) 
 Median 0.0239  0.0425  -0.0185*** (<.0001) 
1 year after N 529 1729   
 Mean 0.0616  0.0799  -0.0183** (0.0309) 
 Median 0.0428  0.0477  -0.0049 (0.1103) 
2 years after  N 400 1088   
 Mean 0.0848  0.0884  -0.0036 (0.7664) 
 Median 0.0461  0.0495  -0.0034 (0.9632) 
Panel C: Close-by vs. Unaffected 
  Close-by Unaffected Test of differences 
    Difference p-value 
Event year N 520 1735   
 Mean 0.0541  0.0695  -0.0154*** (<.0001) 
 Median 0.0373  0.0425  -0.0052* (0.0833) 
1 year after N 515 1729   
 Mean 0.0832  0.0799  0.0033 (0.7319) 
 Median 0.0454  0.0477  -0.0022 (0.5508) 
2 years after  N 387 1088   
 Mean 0.0821  0.0884  -0.0063 (0.6251) 
  Median 0.0431  0.0495  -0.0064 (0.6146) 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%level, respectively. 
We perform pairwise comparisons of premium changes between areas. Panel A provides a comparison 
between affected and close-by states, panel B compares affected and unaffected states, panel C provides a 
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comparison between close-by and unaffected states. The premium changes are significantly different 
between any two areas in the event year but only few of them are significant in the following year. Premium 
income is from Bloomberg. We use Direct Premiums Written, defined as the aggregate amount of recorded 
originated premiums, other than reinsurance, written during the year, whether collected or not, at the close 




Table 6 Abnormal Stock Price Performance 






Mean                      
(t-test) 
CAR<0% 
    N Percentage 
(-5,-1) 137 -0.70% -2.895*** 77  56.20% 
(-1,+1) 137 0.26% 0.735 62  45.26%* 
(0,+1) 137 1.45% 7.424**** 54  39.42%** 
(0,+5) 137 1.52% 3.347**** 63  45.99% 
(0,+10) 137 2.45% 5.05**** 50  36.5%*** 
(0,+20) 137 5.55% 8.426**** 52  37.96%*** 
Note: The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively, using a one-tailed test. We examine changes in the market value of insurers in response to 
catastrophes. The table reports the abnormal performance to our sample firms during various event windows. 
In the pre-event window, i.e. when the hurricane approached the mainland, there is a negative mean 





Table 7 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Table 7: Pearson Correlation Coefficients           




Exposure_affected_T Exposure_closeby_T Firm Size TOBQ ROA Loss Lossratio 
Exposure_affected_T 0.2411***        
 (0.0091)        
Exposure_closeby_T 0.1819* 0.4457***       
 (0.0507) (<.0001)       
Firm Size 0.5809*** 0.1998** 0.1114      
 (<.0001) (0.0175) (0.1886)      
TOBQ -0.0450  -0.0774 0.0112 -0.4705***     
 (0.6376) (0.3685) (0.8967) (<.0001)     
ROA -0.1204 -0.1124 0.0228 -0.2457*** 0.2349***    
 (0.1979) (0.1843) (0.7884) (0.0033) (0.0057)    
Loss -0.0137 -0.0463 -0.1460* 0.0597 -0.3113*** 0.1795**   
 (0.8838) (0.5855) (0.0841) (0.4816) (0.0002) (0.0332)   
Lossratio 0.2930*** 0.4696*** 0.4019*** 0.3792*** -0.1398 -0.1615* -0.0003  
 (0.0018) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1112) (0.0614) (0.9976)  
Linedivers -0.0399 -0.1658* -0.1121 -0.2511*** 0.2211** 0.2350*** 0.0449 -0.4445*** 
  (0.6719) (0.0520) (0.1906) (0.003) (0.0102) (0.0055) (0.6011) (<.0001) 









Table 8 Basic Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Table 8 Basic Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
  CAR(-5,-1)   CAR(-1, 1)   CAR(0, 1)  
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept 0.0093 0.1009* 0.2366* 0.3827** 0.2051* 0.9028*** 0.4811*** 0.1498* 0.8625*** 
 (0.9128) (0.0983) (0.0920) (0.0221) (0.0839) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0984) (<.0001) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.1672  -0.2336 -0.2365  0.0434 -0.0882  0.1921 
 (0.2566)  (0.3495) (0.4094)  (0.9281) (0.6834)  (0.5838) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.4440**  0.9391*** 0.3165  0.6435 0.1782  0.3980 
 (0.0169)  (0.0068) (0.3774)  (0.3285) (0.5100)  (0.4065) 
Loss -0.0019  -0.0131 -0.0374**  -0.0633*** -0.0460***  -0.0646*** 
 (0.8195)  (0.2406) (0.0224)  (0.0039) (0.0002)  (<.0001) 
Firm Size  -0.0305** -0.0294**  -0.0525** -0.0615**  -0.0362* -0.0458** 
  (0.0254) (0.0293)  (0.0467) (0.0185)  (0.0719) (0.0162) 
TOBQ  -0.0043 -0.0046  0.0009 -0.0071  0.0033 -0.0050 
  (0.3491) (0.3646)  (0.9228) (0.4609)  (0.6295) (0.4793) 
ROA  0.5528*** 0.6536***  1.2214*** 1.6044***  0.8356*** 1.2209*** 
  (0.0016) (0.0003)  (0.0004) (<.0001)  (0.0013) (<.0001) 
Lossratio  0.0024 0.0005  0.0019 0.0001  0.0015 -0.0002 
  (0.1955) (0.8169)  (0.5835) (0.9720)  (0.5740) (0.9539) 
Linedivers  0.0119 0.0006  -0.0451 -0.0509  -0.0381 -0.0424 
  (0.6693) (0.9817)  (0.4044) (0.3385)  (0.3571) (0.2736) 
High Rating  0.0229 0.0218  0.0206 0.0257  0.0092 0.0145 
  (0.1105) (0.1214)  (0.4590) (0.3424)  (0.6636) (0.4616) 
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
Adjusted R2 0.0228 0.0983 0.1738 0.0282 0.1383 0.2203 0.0847 0.1242 0.2801 
Pr > F 0.1089 0.0118 0.0010 0.0785 0.0019 0.0001 0.0020 0.0036 <.0001 
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    CAR(0, 5)     CAR(0, 10)     CAR(0,20)   
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept 0.6464*** -0.0096 0.8917*** 0.4811*** 0.1039 0.9396*** 1.0621*** 0.0903 1.2234*** 
 (<.0001) (0.9087) (<.0001) (0.0013) (0.2732) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4913) (<.0001) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.2910  -0.1041 -0.3638  0.2384 -0.4691  0.1207 
 (0.1368)  (0.7377) (0.1517)  (0.5252) (0.1507)  (0.8171) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.1216  -0.0977 0.2249  -0.8076 0.3157  -0.5539 
 (0.6178)  (0.8181) (0.4772)  (0.1171) (0.4380)  (0.4379) 
Loss -0.0618***  -0.0799*** -0.0446***  -0.0737*** -0.0987***  -0.1004*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0022)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Firm Size  0.0075 -0.0105  -0.0210 -0.0393*  -0.0158 -0.0390 
  (0.6836) (0.5273)  (0.3182) (0.0526)  (0.5878) (0.1645) 
TOBQ  0.0186*** 0.0048  0.0068 -0.0066  0.0276*** 0.0102 
  (0.0041) (0.4415)  (0.3438) (0.3830)  (0.0065) (0.3344) 
ROA  0.4900** 0.9385***  0.9131*** 1.3103***  -0.2841 0.2706 
  (0.0390) (<.0001)  (0.0009) (<.0001)  (0.4427) (0.4602) 
Lossratio  -0.0030 -0.0014  0.0003 0.0025  -0.0006 0.0015 
  (0.2336) (0.5871)  (0.9135) (0.4359)  (0.8754) (0.7300) 
Linedivers  -0.1091*** -0.0948***  -0.0740* -0.0547  -0.1199** -0.0994* 
  (0.0051) (0.0067)  (0.0898) (0.1876)  (0.0481) (0.0865) 
High Rating  -0.0133 -0.0002  -0.0043 0.0085  0.0140 0.0304 
  (0.4995) (0.9890)  (0.8468) (0.6849)  (0.6506) (0.3014) 
          
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
Adjusted R2 0.1879 0.1311 0.3437 0.0639 0.1203 0.2495 0.1762 0.0911 0.2178 
Pr > F <.0001 0.0026 <.0001 0.0081 0.0044 <.0001 <.0001 0.0162 0.0001 
Notes: The table reports the results of basic OLS regressions of CARs in different event windows, with insurer and hurricane characteristics as the 
46 
 
independent variables. Specifically, the independent variables include Exposure (Exposure_affected_T and Exposure_closeby_T), measured as the 
ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in the affected state(s) and close-by state(s) to total premiums earned, respectively; Loss, which represents 
the total estimated damages (in $billion) caused by a given hurricane, adjusted by CPI; Firm Size, measured as the log of total assets; Tobin’s Q 
(TOBQ), measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets; ROA, i.e. the ratio of pretax 
profits to total assets; the log of the loss ratio (Lossratio), defined as the total losses incurred in the homeowners’ line of business; Linedivers, a 
measure of line diversification, calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of insurance premiums earned in each business line to the total 
premiums earned in all property-liability lines; and High Rating, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard 
& Poor’s is A or better (and 0 otherwise). P-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 






















Table 9 Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns with Year and Insurer Fixed Effects 
Table 9 Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns with Year and Insurer Fixed Effects 
          CAR(-5,-1)         
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept -0.0828 0.1274** 0.2310 -0.0515 0.4342 0.4793 -0.0960 0.5962 0.1441 
 (0.8130) (0.0326) (0.6086) (0.5949) (0.3910) (0.3231) (0.7889) (0.2455) (0.9053) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.1265  -0.1584 0.2681  -0.0949 0.1880  -0.0933 
 (0.3923)  (0.5340) (0.4024)  (0.7972) (0.5635)  (0.8007) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.3566*  0.7114* 0.9682***  1.2342*** 0.7586*  1.0352** 
 (0.0599)  (0.0606) (0.0086)  (0.0042) (0.0557)  (0.0287) 
Loss 0.0072  -0.0111 0.0039  0.0012 0.0083  0.0395 
 (0.8249)  (0.7852) (0.6696)  (0.9286) (0.8022)  (0.6567) 
Firm Size  -0.0370*** -0.0323**  -0.1481 -0.1461  -0.1623 -0.1564 
  (0.0056) (0.0185)  (0.1711) (0.1705)  (0.1404) (0.1451) 
TOBQ  -0.0094* -0.0062  0.0104 0.0025  -0.0043 -0.0026 
  (0.0524) (0.2284)  (0.3903) (0.8449)  (0.7648) (0.8512) 
ROA  0.7165*** 0.6850***  1.3247*** 1.2023***  1.3152*** 1.2093*** 
  (<.0001) (0.0002)  (<.0001) (0.0002)  (<.0001) (0.0001) 
Lossratio  0.0027 0.0010  0.0301 0.0438*  0.0395 0.0461* 
  (0.1282) (0.6378)  (0.2219) (0.0700)  (0.1089) (0.0583) 
Linedivers  0.0181 0.0055  0.1332 0.0733  0.0335 0.0372 
  (0.5005) (0.8429)  (0.5121) (0.7071)  (0.8694) (0.8514) 
High Rating  0.0265* 0.0233*  0.1100*** 0.0920**  0.0928** 0.0865** 
  (0.0569) (0.0999)  (0.0055) (0.0152)  (0.0181) (0.0237) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Insurer fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
48 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0707 0.2309 0.2611 0.3596 0.5716 0.6324 0.3737 0.6044 0.6384 
Pr > F 0.0839 0.0010 0.0017 0.4954 0.0131 0.0033 0.5006 0.0076 0.0038 
     CAR(-1, 1)     
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept -0.1476 0.2342** 0.5688 0.3257* 2.1224** 2.3254** -0.1591 1.8623* 3.0679 
 (0.8305) (0.0409) (0.5180) (0.0867) (0.0451) (0.0291) (0.8210) (0.0843) (0.2478) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.2408  0.0580 0.3366  -0.1414 0.3709  -0.1405 
 (0.4083)  (0.9070) (0.5890)  (0.8593) (0.5611)  (0.8613) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.3220  0.5675 1.0133  0.5492 1.1244  0.4419 
 (0.3860)  (0.4391) (0.1521)  (0.5413) (0.1463)  (0.6617) 
Loss 0.0114  -0.0324 -0.0314*  -0.0488* 0.0130  -0.1134 
 (0.8583)  (0.6844) (0.0772)  (0.0994) (0.8408)  (0.5581) 
Firm Size  -0.0660*** -0.0615**  -0.5318** -0.4301*  -0.4400* -0.4357* 
  (0.0100) (0.0214)  (0.0190) (0.0637)  (0.0569) (0.0638) 
TOBQ  -0.0115 -0.0079  0.0142 -0.0077  -0.0119 -0.0105 
  (0.2136) (0.4320)  (0.5709) (0.7825)  (0.6890) (0.7305) 
ROA  1.6465*** 1.6197***  2.1027*** 2.3251***  2.3677*** 2.3289*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0011) (0.0006)  (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Lossratio  0.0024 0.0003  0.0113 0.0234  0.0209 0.0246 
  (0.4738) (0.9508)  (0.8237) (0.6505)  (0.6806) (0.6379) 
Linedivers  -0.0327 -0.0480  -0.0861 -0.1845  -0.2086 -0.2039 
  (0.5253) (0.3755)  (0.8372) (0.6618)  (0.6242) (0.6376) 
High Rating  0.0285 0.0251  0.0747 0.0651  0.0651 0.0621 
  (0.2836) (0.3615)  (0.3473) (0.4163)  (0.4167) (0.4468) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Insurer fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
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Adjusted R2 0.0544 0.2801 0.2886 0.3628 0.5377 0.5652 0.3685 0.5638 0.5657 
Pr > F 0.1915 <.0001 0.0004 0.4738 0.0419 0.0435 0.5358 0.0337 0.0573 
     CAR(0, 1)     
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept -0.1893 0.1789** 0.4345 0.4397*** 1.6420** 1.8758** -0.1942 1.3409* 2.2946 
 (0.7151) (0.0321) (0.4968) (0.0026) (0.0415) (0.0168) (0.7135) (0.0882) (0.2369) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.0805  0.2227 0.3291  -0.0481 0.3178  -0.0463 
 (0.7126)  (0.5371) (0.4847)  (0.9345) (0.5079)  (0.9372) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.1573  0.2647 0.7561  0.3028 0.7532  0.0884 
 (0.5727)  (0.6190) (0.1572)  (0.6457) (0.1949)  (0.9046) 
Loss 0.0159  -0.0247 -0.0416***  -0.0579*** 0.0168  -0.0887 
 (0.7410)  (0.6695) (0.0024)  (0.0088) (0.7306)  (0.5308) 
Firm Size  -0.0498*** -0.0462**  -0.4152** -0.2966*  -0.3089* -0.3077* 
  (0.0077) (0.0174)  (0.0161) (0.0805)  (0.0665) (0.0730) 
TOBQ  -0.0091 -0.0063  0.0196 -0.0047  -0.0107 -0.0103 
  (0.1759) (0.3930)  (0.3047) (0.8185)  (0.6218) (0.6451) 
ROA  1.2623*** 1.2456***  1.5107*** 1.8037***  1.8179*** 1.8113*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0019) (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Lossratio  0.0020 0.0001  0.0008 0.0104  0.0120 0.0129 
  (0.4159) (0.9850)  (0.9840) (0.7831)  (0.7465) (0.7361) 
Linedivers  -0.0257 -0.0380  -0.0622 -0.1641  -0.2045 -0.2030 
  (0.4935) (0.3344)  (0.8450) (0.5957)  (0.5104) (0.5214) 
High Rating  0.0172 0.0140  0.0499 0.0440  0.0387 0.0381 
  (0.3740) (0.4836)  (0.4087) (0.4534)  (0.5075) (0.5232) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Insurer fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
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Adjusted R2 0.1171 0.3366 0.3469 0.3988 0.5355 0.5936 0.4099 0.5965 0.5967 
Pr > F 0.0056 <.0001 <.0001 0.2505 0.0448 0.0166 0.2721 0.0104 0.0209 
     CAR(0, 5)     
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept -0.0956 0.0299 0.1463 0.5388*** 0.9943 1.1969** -0.1343 0.7524 0.3362 
 (0.8364) (0.6751) (0.7904) (<.0001) (0.1265) (0.0469) (0.7335) (0.2097) (0.8177) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.2524  0.0175 -0.0888  -0.5202 -0.1688  -0.5167 
 (0.1975)  (0.9550) (0.8026)  (0.2530) (0.6370)  (0.2479) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.0342  -0.5364 0.5671  0.0315 0.3844  -0.4025 
 (0.8907)  (0.2439) (0.1601)  (0.9507) (0.3739)  (0.4715) 
Loss 0.0072  -0.0091 -0.0532***  -0.0621*** 0.0091  0.0333 
 (0.8672)  (0.8550) (<.0001)  (0.0004) (0.8026)  (0.7551) 
Firm Size  -0.0086 -0.0139  -0.2313* -0.1006  -0.1310 -0.1230 
  (0.5889) (0.4020)  (0.0952) (0.4387)  (0.3055) (0.3384) 
TOBQ  0.0042 0.0011  0.0323** 0.0116  -0.0027 0.0003 
  (0.4735) (0.8641)  (0.0397) (0.4387)  (0.8720) (0.9864) 
ROA  0.9803*** 1.0099***  0.3297 0.6913*  0.6303* 0.7067* 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.3876) (0.0628)  (0.0770) (0.0533) 
Lossratio  -0.0024 -0.0006  0.0027 0.0141  0.0171 0.0190 
  (0.2606) (0.8301)  (0.9301) (0.6311)  (0.5489) (0.5103) 
Linedivers  -0.0943*** -0.0827**  -0.2223 -0.3035  -0.3976* -0.3822 
  (0.0043) (0.0162)  (0.3922) (0.2074)  (0.0987) (0.1138) 
High Rating  -0.0039 0.0003  0.0127 0.0083  -0.0043 -0.0037 
  (0.8129) (0.9876)  (0.7951) (0.8553)  (0.9239) (0.9337) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Insurer fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
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Adjusted R2 0.2309 0.4264 0.4375 0.6253 0.6436 0.7181 0.6413 0.7248 0.7327 
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     CAR(0,10)     
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept -0.2552 0.1263 0.4007 0.4177*** 1.5866* 1.7782** -0.2433 1.3036 1.0613 
 (0.6741) (0.1572) (0.5556) (0.0072) (0.0501) (0.0269) (0.6667) (0.1101) (0.5926) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.3506  0.3171 -0.1305  0.3903 -0.1300  0.3921 
 (0.1721)  (0.4089) (0.7950)  (0.5169) (0.7995)  (0.5170) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.1916  -1.0969* 0.7876  -0.4097 0.8168  -0.6333 
 (0.5571)  (0.0549) (0.1675)  (0.5453) (0.1881)  (0.4046) 
Loss 0.0235  -0.0227 -0.0348**  -0.0470** 0.0260  0.0274 
 (0.6761)  (0.7126) (0.0161)  (0.0363) (0.6177)  (0.8503) 
Firm Size  -0.0331* -0.0413**  -0.3642** -0.2736  -0.2752 -0.2851 
  (0.0967) (0.0446)  (0.0349) (0.1158)  (0.1142) (0.1049) 
TOBQ  -0.0045 -0.0091  0.0109 -0.0069  -0.0096 -0.0128 
  (0.5322) (0.2444)  (0.5686) (0.7428)  (0.6702) (0.5790) 
ROA  1.3050*** 1.3580***  0.8296* 1.1138**  1.0783** 1.1218** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0817) (0.0250)  (0.0267) (0.0248) 
Lossratio  0.0007 0.0030  0.0445 0.0417  0.0511 0.0443 
  (0.7880) (0.3462)  (0.2528) (0.2851)  (0.1875) (0.2614) 
Linedivers  -0.0631 -0.0466  -0.2180 -0.2784  -0.3065 -0.3190 
  (0.1205) (0.2666)  (0.4970) (0.3821)  (0.3434) (0.3280) 
High Rating  0.0029 0.0087  -0.0142 -0.0076  -0.0188 -0.0138 
  (0.8905) (0.6811)  (0.8142) (0.8997)  (0.7568) (0.8220) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Insurer fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
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Adjusted R2 0.0958 0.2988 0.3273 0.4875 0.5714 0.6091 0.4969 0.6032 0.6121 
Pr > F 0.0203 <.0001 <.0001 0.0166 0.0132 0.0091 0.0209 0.0079 0.0117 
     CAR(0,20)     
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept -0.4641 0.1192 0.3726 0.9347*** 1.1037 1.4310 -0.4814 0.6174 -1.2524 
 (0.5482) (0.3312) (0.6948) (<.0001) (0.3458) (0.2133) (0.5243) (0.5967) (0.6648) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.4403  0.1672 0.0711  0.2052 0.0310  0.2055 
 (0.1780)  (0.7550) (0.9168)  (0.8142) (0.9639)  (0.8155) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.2438  -0.7758 1.3460*  0.5067 1.3004  0.4704 
 (0.5575)  (0.3279) (0.0827)  (0.6063) (0.1181)  (0.6705) 
Loss 0.0424  -0.0213 -0.0847***  -0.0748** 0.0457  0.1744 
 (0.5533)  (0.8043) (<.0001)  (0.0223) (0.5124)  (0.4114) 
Firm Size  -0.0327 -0.0393  -0.3005 -0.1494  -0.1493 -0.1513 
  (0.2315) (0.1693)  (0.2285) (0.5507)  (0.5493) (0.5512) 
TOBQ  0.0116 0.0080  0.0392 0.0052  0.0051 0.0043 
  (0.2482) (0.4649)  (0.1640) (0.8655)  (0.8746) (0.8989) 
ROA  0.2736 0.3137  -1.0246 -0.6679  -0.6027 -0.6666 
  (0.4543) (0.3986)  (0.1403) (0.3460)  (0.3825) (0.3512) 
Lossratio  -0.0001 0.0019  0.0808 0.0921  0.0916 0.0925 
  (0.9843) (0.6763)  (0.1573) (0.1062)  (0.1033) (0.1093) 
Linedivers  -0.1046* -0.0916  0.0539 -0.0911  -0.0919 -0.0977 
  (0.0622) (0.1192)  (0.9085) (0.8433)  (0.8435) (0.8365) 
High Rating  0.0241 0.0290  -0.1050 -0.1130  -0.1120 -0.1140 
  (0.4006) (0.3284)  (0.2390) (0.1989)  (0.2037) (0.2041) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Insurer fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
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Adjusted R2 0.2203 0.2854 0.2936 0.4993 0.5067 0.5570 0.5211 0.5553 0.5570 
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 0.0101 0.1000 0.0559 0.0075 0.0440 0.0733 
Notes: The table reports the results of a series of CAR regression in different event windows, with insurer and hurricane characteristics under year 
fixed effect, insurer fixed effect and both of the fixed effects, respectively. Specifically, the independent variables include Exposure 
(Exposure_affected_T and Exposure_closeby_T), measured as the ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in the affected state(s) and close-by state(s) 
to total premiums earned, respectively; Loss, which represents the total estimated damages (in $billion) caused by a given hurricane, adjusted by 
CPI; Firm Size, measured as the log of total assets; Tobin’s Q (TOBQ), measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities 
divided by the book value of assets; ROA, i.e. the ratio of pretax profits to total assets; the log of the loss ratio (Lossratio), defined as the total losses 
incurred in the homeowners’ line of business; Linedivers, a measure of line diversification, calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of 
insurance premiums earned in each business line to the total premiums earned in all property-liability lines; and High Rating, a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s is A or better (and 0 otherwise). P-values are reported in parentheses below 




















Table 10 Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns Clustered by Year and Firm 






CAR(0, 1) CAR(0, 5) CAR(0,10) CAR(0,20) 
Intercept 0.0093 0.3827* 0.4811*** 0.6464*** 0.4811*** 1.0621*** 
 (0.9268) (0.0703) (0.0025) (<.0001) (0.0059) (<.0001) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.1672* -0.2365* -0.0882 -0.2910* -0.3638 -0.4691 
 (0.0739) (0.0846) (0.4360) (0.0660) (0.1282) (0.1053) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.4440*** 0.3165* 0.1782 0.1216 0.2249 0.3157 
 (0.0036) (0.0615) (0.1811) (0.6056) (0.5722) (0.4467) 
Loss -0.0019 -0.0374* -0.0460*** -0.0618*** -0.0446*** -0.0987*** 
 (0.8412) (0.0575) (0.0020) (<.0001) (0.0066) (<.0001) 
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 137 
Adjusted R2 0.02280 0.02820 0.08470 0.18790 0.06390 0.17620 
Pr > F 0.10890 0.07850 0.00200 <.0001 0.00810 <.0001 
Notes: The table reports the results of a series of CARs regressions in different event windows, with insurer and hurricane characteristics clustered 
by year and firm as the independent variables. Specifically, the independent variables include Exposure (Exposure_affected_T and 
Exposure_closeby_T), measured as the ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in the affected state(s) and close-by state(s) to total premiums earned, 
respectively; and loss, which represents the total estimated damage caused by a given hurricane, adjusted by CPI. Heteroscedasticity consistent p-













Table 11 Robust Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Table 11 Robust Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
  CAR(-5,-1)   CAR(-1, 1)   CAR(0, 1)  
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept 0.0718 -0.0276 0.0391 0.5651*** -0.0098 0.5877*** 0.5991*** -0.0110 0.6340*** 
 (0.1263) (0.4627) (0.5677) (<.0001) (0.8308) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8149) (<.0001) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.2410***  -0.3682*** -0.2906***  -0.2957* -0.1535*  -0.1066 
 (0.003)  (0.0026) (0.0017)  (0.0682) (0.0783)  (0.4676) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.4670***  0.9854*** 0.1052  0.3952* 0.0659  0.3038 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.3630)  (0.0744) (0.5453)  (0.1296) 
Loss -0.0074  -0.0066 -0.0542***  -0.0564*** -0.0570***  -0.0600*** 
 (0.1059)  (0.2288) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Firm Size  0.0027 0.0056  0.0045 0.0017  0.0058 0.0007 
  (0.7500) (0.3894)  (0.6581) (0.8458)  (0.5743) (0.9251) 
TOBQ  0.0015 -0.0003  0.0103*** 0.0038  0.0105*** 0.0029 
  (0.5982) (0.9182)  (0.0034) (0.2426)  (0.0031) (0.3313) 
ROA  -0.0633 0.2561***  -0.3634*** 0.0952  -0.2919** 0.1727* 
  (0.5497) (0.0028)  (0.0051) (0.4023)  (0.0270) (0.0933) 
Lossratio  0.0007 -0.0008  -0.0020 -0.0017  -0.0013 -0.0016 
  (0.5260) (0.4269)  (0.1519) (0.2112)  (0.3454) (0.2093) 
Linedivers  0.0151 -0.0076  -0.0268 -0.0356**  -0.0276 -0.0314* 
  (0.3817) (0.5725)  (0.2032) (0.0462)  (0.1990) (0.0520) 
High Rating  0.0043 -0.0015  -0.0067 0.0045  -0.0101 -0.0012 
  (0.6293) (0.8223)  (0.5395) (0.6203)  (0.3583) (0.8885) 
          
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
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Adjusted R2 0.1044 0.0156 0.2402 0.3426 0.1308 0.3920 0.3980 0.1168 0.4630 
  CAR(0, 5)   CAR(0,10)   CAR(0,20)  
 (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept 0.5565*** -0.0512 0.5643*** 0.4698*** -0.0166 0.5416*** 0.8446*** -0.0980 0.9649*** 
 (<.0001) (0.3669) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.7726) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3292) (<.0001) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.2261**  -0.0044 -0.1025  0.0364 -0.3352  0.0122 
 (0.0449)  (0.9819) (0.4581)  (0.8654) (0.1413)  (0.9694) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.2088  0.0033 -0.4170**  -0.4580 0.3579  -0.0089 
 (0.1384)  (0.9902) (0.0157)  (0.1187) (0.2091)  (0.9836) 
Loss -0.0536***  -0.0554*** -0.0437***  -0.0488*** -0.0787***  -0.0947*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Firm Size  0.0149 0.0056  0.0079 -0.0044  0.0214 0.0079 
  (0.2360) (0.5921)  (0.5331) (0.7003)  (0.3365) (0.6396) 
TOBQ  0.0188*** 0.0085**  0.0136*** 0.0051  0.0299*** 0.0048 
  (<.0001) (0.0306)  (0.0018) (0.2374)  (<.0001) (0.4497) 
ROA  -0.4030** 0.0982  -0.5359*** -0.1408  -0.4306 0.9557*** 
  (0.0117) (0.4738)  (0.0009) (0.3500)  (0.1285) (<.0001) 
Lossratio  -0.0033** -0.0024  -0.0015 0.0008  -0.0017 -0.0008 
  (0.0497) (0.1477)  (0.3660) (0.6411)  (0.5620) (0.7722) 
Linedivers  -0.0605** -0.0535**  -0.0365 -0.0371  -0.0509 -0.0565 
  (0.0198) (0.0132)  (0.1637) (0.1176)  (0.2693) (0.1058) 
High Rating  -0.0159 -0.0141  -0.0119 -0.0087  -0.0094 -0.0128 
  (0.2332) (0.2008)  (0.3791) (0.4731)  (0.6902) (0.4728) 
          
Observations 137 106 106 137 106 106 137 106 106 
Adjusted R2 0.2099 0.1295 0.2672 0.1238 0.0905 0.2222 0.1253 0.0801 0.2361 
Notes: The table reports the results of a series of CAR robust regression in different event windows, with insurer and hurricane characteristics as the 
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independent variables. Specifically, the independent variables include Exposure (Exposure_affected_T and Exposure_closeby_T), measured as the 
ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in the affected state(s) and close-by state(s) to total premiums earned, respectively; Loss, which represents 
the total estimated damages (in $billion) caused by a given hurricane, adjusted by CPI; Firm Size, measured as the log of total assets; Tobin’s Q 
(TOBQ), measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets; ROA, i.e. the ratio of pretax 
profits to total assets; the log of the loss ratio (Lossratio), defined as the total losses incurred in the homeowners’ line of business; Linedivers, a 
measure of line diversification, calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of insurance premiums earned in each business line to the total 
premiums earned in all property-liability lines; and High Rating, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard 
& Poor’s is A or better (and 0 otherwise). P-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 























Table 12 Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns with Interaction Terms 
Table 12 Regressions of Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns with Interaction Terms 
 CAR(-5, 1)  CAR(-1, 1)  CAR(0, 1)  
 (A) (C) (A) (C) (A) (C) 
Intercept 0.0422  0.2455* 0.4225** 0.8805*** 0.4998*** 0.8364*** 
 (0.6562) (0.0898) (0.0270) (0.0022) (0.0006) (<.0001) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.3585  -0.7487* -0.3934  -0.6980  -0.1184  -0.2008  
 (0.1095) (0.0673) (0.3777) (0.3785) (0.7246) (0.7283) 
Exposure_affected_H 0.0295  0.0689* 0.0252  0.0932  0.0061  0.0552  
 (0.3592) (0.0720) (0.6940) (0.2104) (0.8992) (0.3095) 
Proportion_Home 0.0179  0.1626  -0.0011  0.2850  -0.0159  0.1576  
 (0.6511) (0.2791) (0.9893) (0.3307) (0.7896) (0.4611) 
Exposure_closeby_T 0.7463** 0.8627* 0.6198  0.3250  0.3331  0.1509  
 (0.0146) (0.0866) (0.3050) (0.7388) (0.4645) (0.8321) 
Exposure_closeby_H -0.0655  -0.0041  -0.0635  0.0264  -0.0294  0.0324  
 (0.1615) (0.9405) (0.4955) (0.8038) (0.6755) (0.6771) 
Loss -0.0051  -0.0161  -0.0410** -0.0639*** -0.0476*** -0.0635*** 
 (0.5810) (0.1765) (0.0272) (0.0068) (0.0008) (0.0003) 
Firm Size  -0.0254*  -0.0547**  -0.0423** 
  (0.0704)  (0.0462)  (0.0352) 
TOBQ  -0.0026   -0.0042   -0.0037  
  (0.6337)  (0.6944)  (0.6352) 
ROA  0.7152***  1.6925***  1.2760*** 
  (0.0002)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Lossratio  -0.0016   -0.0043   -0.0029  
  (0.5580)  (0.4308)  (0.4573) 
Linedivers  -0.0043   -0.0622   -0.0462  
  (0.8880)  (0.3005)  (0.2922) 
High Rating  0.0192   0.0206   0.0118  
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  (0.1817)  (0.4622)  (0.5627) 
       
Observations 130 104 130 104 130 104 
Adjusted R2 0.0193  0.1808  0.0059  0.2077  0.0599  0.2620  
Pr > F 0.2111  0.0020  0.3509  0.0006  0.0335  <.0001 
       
 CAR(0, 5)  CAR(0,10)  CAR(0,20)  
 (A) (C) (A) (C) (A) (C) 
Intercept 0.62010*** 0.8709*** 0.4699*** 0.9375*** 0.9095*** 1.0681*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0056) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0005) 
Exposure_affected_T -0.1223  -0.2399  -0.4027  -0.0321  -0.5132  0.6509  
 (0.6824) (0.6407) (0.3062) (0.9588) (0.2929) (0.4365) 
Exposure_affected_H -0.0179  -0.0005  0.0181  0.0263  0.0306  0.0034  
 (0.6771) (0.9910) (0.7497) (0.6525) (0.6629) (0.9652) 
Proportion_Home -0.0542  0.1507  -0.0358  0.1177  0.0181  -0.0476  
 (0.3079) (0.4280) (0.6073) (0.6091) (0.8337) (0.8775) 
Exposure_closeby_T -0.0547  -0.5908  0.3657  -0.9477  -0.7682  -1.7561* 
 (0.8925) (0.3516) (0.4921) (0.2184) (0.2453) (0.0903) 
Exposure_closeby_H 0.0485  0.0616  -0.0159  0.0066  0.2292  0.2809** 
 (0.4381) (0.3741) (0.8461) (0.9374) (0.0258) (0.0140) 
Loss -0.0590*** -0.0789*** -0.0433*** -0.0745*** -0.0851*** -0.0834*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0085) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0009) 
Firm Size  -0.0076   -0.0363*  -0.0452  
  (0.6661)  (0.0917)  (0.1173) 
TOBQ  0.0062   -0.0052   0.0050  
  (0.3713)  (0.5417)  (0.6562) 
ROA  0.9912***  1.3422***  0.3849  
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.3057) 
Lossratio  -0.0035   0.0010   -0.0014  
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  (0.3239)  (0.8214)  (0.8029) 
Linedivers  -0.1039***  -0.0610   -0.0689  
  (0.0087)  (0.1976)  (0.2772) 
High Rating  -0.0020   0.0064   0.0362  
  (0.9115)  (0.7720)  (0.2213) 
       
Observations 130 104 130 104 130 104 
Adjusted R2 0.1865  0.3223  0.0403  0.2218  0.2069  0.2434  
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 0.0856  0.0003  <.0001 0.0001  
Notes: The table reports the results of a series of CAR regression with interaction item in different event windows, with insurer and hurricane 
characteristics as the independent variables. Specifically, the independent variables include Exposure (Exposure_affected_T and 
Exposure_closeby_T), measured as the ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in the affected state(s) and close-by state(s) to total premiums earned, 
respectively; Exposre (Exposure_affected_H and Exposure_closeby_H), measured as the ratio of homeowner’ premiums earned in affected state(s) 
and close-by state(s) to total homeowners’ premiums earned, respectively; Proportion_Home, measured as the ratio of total homeowners’ insurance 
premiums earned to total premiums earned; Loss, which represents the total estimated damages (in $billion) caused by a given hurricane, adjusted 
by CPI; Firm Size, measured as the log of total assets; Tobin’s Q (TOBQ), measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities 
divided by the book value of assets; ROA, i.e. the ratio of pretax profits to total assets; the log of the loss ratio (Lossratio), defined as the total losses 
incurred in the homeowners’ line of business; Linedivers, a measure of line diversification, calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of 
insurance premiums earned in each business line to the total premiums earned in all property-liability lines; and High Rating, a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s is A or better (and 0 otherwise). P-values are reported in parentheses below 
each coefficient. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%level, respectively. 
